ABSTRACT As an important cryptographic primitive in cloud computing and outsourced computing, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is an animated area in modern cryptography. However, the efficiency of FHE has been a bottleneck that impeding its application. According to Gentry's blueprint, bootstrapping, which is used to control the noise propagation in ciphertexts, is the most important process in FHE. However, bootstrapping is also the most expensive process that affects the scheme's efficiency. This paper has made three improvements to accelerate the bootstrapping. Firstly, as hundreds of serial homomorphic additions take most of the time of bootstrapping, we constructed the logical expression using truth table to reduce the amount of serial homomorphic additions by two-thirds and thus proposed an efficient FHE scheme with bootstrapping within 10 ms. Secondly, the most expensive parts in our bootstrapping, enhanced homomorphic constant multiplication and homomorphic addition, can be implemented in parallel, which may accelerate the bootstrapping. At last, we proposed a set of more efficient combinations of parameters. Analysis shows that our scheme's security level is 128 bits and the correctness is improved compared with CGGI16 scheme in ASIACRYPT 2016. Experiments show that the running time of bootstrapping in this paper is within 10 ms, which is only 52% of CGGI16, and is less than CGGI17 in ASIACRYPT 2017.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can operate on ciphertexts directly, and the output of the operation can be decrypted into a result which is equivalent to doing the same operation directly to plaintext. In other words, FHE has commutative property on encryption and operations, namely, the result of first encryption then doing homomorphic operation, is equal to first doing operation and then encrypt. In 2009, Gentry painted the blueprint for FHE [1] , and since then, there have been a variety of works on construction, efficiency improving and security of FHE schemes [2] - [12] . However, efficiency is the main obstacle that affecting the application of FHE schemes [13] - [19] . The most important factor that affects the efficiency of FHE is the intricate decryption algorithm, which involves many additions, multiplications and rounding operations. As a result, there are many works focus on how to improve the efficiency of bootstrapping.
In 2009, basing on ideal lattice, Gentry [1] constructed the first CPA secure fully homomorphic encryption scheme, which permits arbitrary homomorphic addition and multiplication operations. In this construction, Gentry provided a general method (Bootstrapping + Squashing), called Gentry's blueprint today. According to this method, we can get a FHE from any proper somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme (here ''proper'' means the scheme can run circuits with depth greater than the depth of its own decryption circuit). In 2011, BGV scheme is brought forward by Brakerski et al. [5] . Based on BV11b [3] scheme appeared in 2011, BGV separates Modulus Switching from dimension-modulus, and thus obtains a linearly growing error rate. To further improve efficiency, BGV scheme also made use of Batching technique and RLWE assumption, and finally reached a computation cost ofÕ(λ) for one homomorphic operation. In Crypt 2013, Gentry et al. [6] adopted approximate eigenvector and ciphertext flatten technique to construct a FHE scheme called GSW. In Eurocrypt 2015, Ducas and Micciancio [20] gave a more efficient scheme FHEW, bootstrapping of which only takes 1 second. In Asiacrypt 2016, Chillotti et al. [21] provided a better FHE called CGGI16, whose bootstrapping only takes 0.1 seconds. Considering that multiplication on T ∈ [0, 1) generates a production no bigger than the multipliers, CGGI16 is based on a variant GSW on torus T, called TGSW, which can control the noise more efficiently. What's more, they observed that the external product of TGSW ciphertext (a matrix) and TLWE ciphertext (a vector) can be used to substitute the product of TGSW and TGSW, thus gave a faster bootstrapping. However, we noticed that bootstrapping of THFE involves hundreds of serial homomorphic additions, which restricts its speed.
OUR WORK
Bootstrapping is the most expensive process that affect the scheme's efficiency. Our work has made three improvements to accelerate the bootstrapping. Firstly, as hundreds of serial homomorphic additions take the most time of bootstrapping. We constructed the logical expression using truth table to reduce the number of addition operations by two-thirds, and thus proposed an efficient FHE scheme with bootstrapping within 10ms. Secondly, the two expensive parts in our bootstrapping, EHCM and serial homomorphic additions can be implemented with two different threads in parallel, which can accelerate the bootstrapping. At last, we found a set of more efficient combination of parameters for our scheme. Most of our contributions lie in section II.B.1).3, just jump to the section if you are familiar with CGGI16.
Recently, Chillotti et al. proposed a scheme CGGI17 [22] in ASIACRYPT 2017, whose bootstrapping can be implemented within 13ms. Compared to their scheme, our scheme has two advantages. Firstly, our scheme is faster than CGGI17 [22] in most presented modes, such as Debug/fftw, release/fftw, release/spqlios mode, and the details line in the table1. Secondly, the two main parts, EHCM and serial homomorphic additions in bootstrapping, could be paralleled with two different threads. Comparing to CGGI16, a flaw of our scheme is that the homomorphic evaluation key increase from 52.6M to 70.9M, which is still reasonable. In fact, we combined the bootstrapping of our scheme and CGGI17, and get a more efficient scheme. Our code is presented in https://github.com/lonyliu/ tfhe-10ms.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces some notations and basic concepts [21] . The security parameter is denoted as λ. We denote the set B {0, 1}, the real torus of real numbers modulo 1 T R/Z, two rings of polynomials
, where X N + 1 is the (2N )-th cyclotomic polynomial. We denote M p,q (E) as the set of matrices E p×q .
The distribution χ over the torus T is concentrated iff its support is included in a ball of radius 1/4 of T with high probability [21] . The variance Var(χ) of χ is defined as Var(χ) = minx ∈T p(x)|x −x| 2 . Thex ∈ T which minimizes the Var(χ) is defined as the expectation E(χ ) of χ. The distribution χ over T n or T N [X ] k is also called concentrated iff each component (coefficient) is a concentrated independent distribution over the torus. The expectation E(χ ) is represented by the vector of expectations of each coefficient, and the maximum of each coefficient's variance is denoted by Var(χ ).
Fact 1 [21] : Let χ 1 , χ 2 be two concentrated and independent distributions over either T, T n or T N [X ] k , and e 1 , e 2 ∈ Z such that χ = e 1 χ 1 + e 2 χ 2 remains concentrated, then E(χ) = e 1 E(χ 1 ) + e 2 E(χ 2 ) and Var(χ) ≤ e 2 1 Var(χ 1 ) + e 2 2 Var(χ 2 ). Definition 2 (TLWE) [21] : Define α ≥ 0 as the noise parameter, N be a power of 2, and k ≥ 1 as an integer. The TLWE secret key s ∈ B N [X ] k consists of vectors with k polynomials in , in which the coefficients are 0 or 1. Considering the scheme's security, it is assumed that these private keys are uniformly selected. Let 
The sample is random iff a ∈ T N [X ] k is sampled uniformly and randomly. We call the TLWE sample is trivial if a is fixed to 0, is noiseless if α = 0, and is homogeneous if only if its message µ is 0.
Definition 3 (Phase [21] ):
Definition 4 [21] : Let the TLWE sample c ∈ T N [X ] k+1 be a random variable. c is defined as a valid TLWE ciphertext iff the phase ϕ s (c) is a concentrated distribution where the key s ∈ B N [X ] k . Here gives some definitions:
-the corresponding plaintext of c is denoted as msg(c) ∈ T N [X ], which is the expectation of ϕ s (c);
-the error is denoted as Err(c), which is equal to ϕ s (c) − msg(c);
-the variance of Err(c) is denoted asVar(Err(c)), which is also equal to the variance of ϕ s (c);
-Err(c) ∞ represents for the maximum amplitude of Err(c) (possibly with overwhelming probability).
TGSW Samples [22] : Let s ∈ B N [X ] k be a TLWE secret key and h ∈ M (k+1)l,k+1 (T N [X ]) the gadget. A TGSW sample C of a message µ ∈ is equal to the sum
is a matrix such that each line is a random TLWE sample of 0 under the same key.
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Definition 5 (External Product) [21] : A is defined as a TGSW ciphertext of µ A , b is defined as a TLWE ciphertext of µ b . The product is defined as:
where the decompose function Dec h,β,ε is defined in Lemma 6. In order to control the growth of External Product, Decompose TLWE sample procedure is given in CGGI16. The decompose algorithm operation can decompose a given TLWE sample into a higher dimension and smaller coefficient vector.
Lemma 6 (Decompose TLWE Sample) [21] : Let l ∈ N and B g ∈ N. Then for quality
) is an matrix, in which each column contains the information about the decompose precision. Dec h,β,ε for any TLWE ciphertext v ∈ T N [X ] k+1 , it outputs a small vector u ∈ (k+1)l with u ∞ ≤ β and
Theorem 7 (External Product [21] ): A and b are defined in definition 5, let β = B g /2 and ε = 1/(2B l g ) be the parameters used in the decomposition
Lemma 9 (Key switching [21] :
The noise variance is denoted as η Var(Err(a , b )), and the keyswitching keys are denoted as KS s →s,γ ,t , where s ∈ {0, 1} n . The key switching outputs a 
A. THE GENERAL IDEA OF BOOTSTRAPPING
In 2009, Gentry provided a general method to build FHE: Bootstrapping+Squashing. Starting from a somewhat homomorphic scheme and using bootstrapping, we can get a fully homomorphic one. The bootstrapping can translate a given ciphertext with large noise to a ciphertext with smaller noise. Bootstrapping is the foundation and the core step of most fully homomorphic encryption. It is also the most important process that affects the efficiency of most FHE. In the following years, researchers have deeply studied on bootstrapping and made some improvements. The principle of bootstrapping is briefly elaborated in Fig1.
In the process of bootstrapping, decryption algorithm of the internal scheme is homomorphically run by the external scheme. Given a ''noisy'' internal ciphertext c (''noisy'' means it has a large noise, which is also called error, and the noise is a random term in encryption, which is often used in lattice based schemes), the external ciphertext ENC(s), the transform key(which is used to transform external ciphertext to internal ciphertext). Let m denotes the plaintext corresponding to the internal ciphertext c, s denotes the key of c. Bootstrapping works as the following: the first step is to generate the external ciphertext ENC(c). Considering that the ciphertext will not leak the information of the plaintext, so we can directly use c or trivial ENC(c) as the external (the trivial ENC(c) means that it has the form of external ciphertext, but with no noise). The second step is to operate the internal decryption algorithm homomorphically (Homdec) with external scheme. Noticing that Homdec(ENC(s), ENC(c)) is equal to ENC(dec(s, c)) by the property of homomorphic encryption. Finally, if the external and internal ciphertexts have different format, we should take an additional step to transform the external ciphertext ENC(dec(s, c)) into an internal ciphertext corresponding to the same plaintext.
After homomorphically run the internal decryption algorithm (Homdec) on ENC(s) and ENC(c), the result Homdec(ENC(s), ENC(c)) is equal to ENC(dec(s, c)) = ENC(m). The internal ciphertext c is decrypted into plaintext m, thus the large noise involved in ciphertext c will vanish. While the noise of external ciphertext is generated from ENC(s) and increases after the process of Homdec and ciphertext transformation. But as long as the final internal ciphertext has smaller error than the initial internal ciphertext, the aim of error reducing is reached. To improve efficiency, the process of Homdec and ciphertext transformation should also be simple and direct.
B. BOOTSTRAPPING
Bootstrapping in CGGI16 contains two functions, error descending and plaintext adjusting. The former decreases ciphertext error through trivial bootstrapping. The latter process can output a ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext space {µ 0 , µ 1 } ∈ T 2 , which is helpful in boolean circuit, comparing to most of the prior bootstrapping which can only output ciphertext with the plaintext space {0,1}. Bootstrapping in CGGI16 also has three steps: generating the external ciphertext ENC(c), homomorphic decrypting the internal ciphertext and ciphertext transformation. The main contribution of this article is the improvement to homomorphic decryption, and we will highlight it in this section.
1) GENERATING THE EXTERNAL CIPHERTEXT
Given that the internal ciphertext c does not leak the plaintext information, we directly use c = (a, b) as the external ciphertext, rather than ENC(c).
2) HOMOMORPHIC DECRYPTION
The decryption algorithm of internal scheme includes onetime round function round(), n times constant multiplications a i ·s i ,where a i are regarded as constants, and n times additions n−1 i=0 a i · s i . Our main constructions lie in the process of constant multiplication a i · s i . Details of the decryption algorithm lie in the following formulas.
a: HOMOMORPHIC ROUND FUNCTION
Round function involves a multi-to-2 mapping, which is hard to implement with normal operations like addition and multiplication. One solution given by FHEW [20] is followed. Mapping the input integer i ∈ [0, N − 1] to the power of X in a coefficient limited polynomial X i mod (1 + X N ), and construct round function through a multi-to-2 mapping between the power of X and coefficients of a polynomial, e.g., if the coefficient of polynomial is limited to {0, 1/2} and N = 4, then the polynomial 1/2X 0 + 0X 1 + 1/2X 2 + 0X 3 can form a multi-to-2 mapping f between the power and coefficients of X in polynomials, where Considering that multiplication on T ∈ [0, 1) generates a production less than the multipliers, CGGI16 limited the computation space to T. In order to map elements in T to the power of a polynomial in T N [X ], we need to expand the
(where X 2N = 1 mod (X N + 1)). Since the domain of round function has been expanded, domain of other operations in Homdec should accordingly be changed into [0, 2N ).
b: HOMOMORPHIC ADDITION
Decryption involves n times additions. The addends can be mapped as the power of X , thus homomorphic addition can be implemented by polynomial multiplication. However, the normal homomorphic multiplication generates large errors. To control error increasing, CGGI16 takes advantage of two properties of GSW (TGSW) scheme. One is that the noise bound of homomorphic multiplication is decided by the bound of left multiplier ciphertext mainly. The other is that, multiplication on T ∈ [0, 1) generates a product smaller than the multipliers. As a result, CGGI16 gives out external product to construct homomorphic addition.
Noticing that homomorphic addition (external product) has the form of TGSW × TLWE → TLWE. If there needs to do addition continuously, the new ciphertexts participating in addition should be TGSW ciphertexts. This is shown in Fig. 2 . These serial homomorphic additions make the scheme hard to do the hundreds of additions in parallel. As a result, bootstrapping often needs to do hundreds of serial homomorphic additions, which severely affects efficiency.
c: OUR CONTRIBUTION-ENHANCED HOMOMORPHIC CONSTANT MULTIPLICATION, EHCM
To run bootstrapping more efficiently, we wish to homomorphicly compute
, called homomorphic constant multiplication. Then CGGI16 does n times homomorphic additions on the power of X to get the TRLWE ciphertext of
However, homomorphic addition on the power of X in polynomials involves multiplying a vector and a matrix, which hundreds of serial homomorphic additions are very expensive and cannot be done parallelly. To solve this problem, we constructed the EHCM (enhanced homomorphic constant multiplication). The idea is as follows:
When the secret key is taken from {0,1}, instead of computing the ciphertext of X −ā i ·s i , we can directly generate the ciphertext of X −a i−1 ·s i−1 −a i ·s i , this means the construct The true table of X −a i−1 ·s i−1 −a i ·s i can be expressed in the following formula. The formula shows the way to construct EHCM in plaintext. Definition 10 and Theorem 11 present how to construct EHCM in ciphertext homomorphically.
Definition 10 (Bootstrapping Key, BK): s ∈ B n , s ∈ B N [X ] k are defined as the secret key and α be a noise parameter. Let the bootstrapping key BK s→s ,
. Theorem 11 (EHCM):
Let s ∈ B n , s ∈ B N [X ] k be secret key, α be a noise parameter, and let BK = BK s→s ,α be a bootstrapping key,
We analyzed the correctness of X −a 2i−1 ·s 2i−1 −a 2i ·s 2i , the bound of error and the error variance in ciphertext.
First, we analyzed the correctness of X −a 2i−1 ·s 2i−1 −a 2i ·s 2i .
Next, we analyzed the bound of error in ciphertext.
Err(Keybundle i )
Finally, we analyzed the error variance in ciphertext.
Var(Err(Keybundle
Combining the analysis and construction, we give the overall process of our Homdec in bootstrapping in Fig. 3 .
There are three types of ciphertext involved in Fig. 3 (TGSW ciphertext, TLWE ciphertext, and LWE ciphertext). The main process of bootstrapping is as follows.
Preprocessing: Generate the bootstrapping key TGSW s ,α (X −a 2i−1 ·s 2i−1 −a 2i ·s 2i ) (TGSW ciphertext) using the method in Theorem 11. The first step is to generate the TLWE ciphertext trivialTLWE a=0 (Xb · testv). Second, compute the external product for n/2 times to generate the TLWE ciphertext Some Tricks for Implement: Firstly, the processes of generating ciphertexts TGSW (X −a 2i−1 ·s 2i−1 −a 2i ·s 2i ) are independent of serial homomorphic additions. We can generate the TGSW ciphertexts at the same time when operating serial homomorphic additions with two different threads. This parallel mode can accelerate the bootstrapping process. Secondly, the processes of generating ciphertexts TGSW (X −a 2i−1 ·s 2i−1 −a 2i ·s 2i ) : 4 , which only involve rotations and additions of polynomials, can be realized by computer quickly. Therefore, we recommend generate it before DFT process.
3) CIPHERTEXT TRANSFORMATION
As shown in Fig. 3 , the process of Homdec should output a LWE ciphertext, with corresponding key s ∈ Z kN . To guarantee the output of bootstrapping can be decrypted by the initial private key s ∈ B n , TLWE Extraction function and KeySwitch procedure are given in CGGI16. TLWE Extraction function can truncate the constant term of polynomial homomorphically. KeySwitch procedure is designed to transform the ciphertext with secret key s to another ciphertext with secret key s, while the corresponding plaintext remains the same.
III. BOOTSTRAPPING IN 10 ms
Generally, FHE scheme is composed of the basic encryption scheme (internal scheme), homomorphic operations and bootstrapping process. Our scheme adopts the internal scheme and homomorphic operations in CGGI16. The main differences lie in the bootstrapping part. This section focuses on the construction and analysis of the bootstrapping process.
A. THE CONSTRUCTION OF OUR BOOTSTRAPPING
Combining the analysis in section II and the overall process of Homdec, we give the details of enhanced bootstrapping in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Our Bootstrapping
Input:
Theorem 12 (Bootstrapping Theorem
) denotes the gadget defined in Equation 1 and Dec h,β,ε is defined as the associated vector gadget decomposition function. Let s ∈ B n , s ∈ B N [X ] k and α, γ denote the noise amplitudes. Let BK = BK s→s ,α , s = KeyExtract(s ) ∈ B kN and KS = KS s →s,γ ,t . Given (a, b) ∈ LWE s,η (µ) for µ ∈ T, two fixed messages µ 0 , µ 1 , Algorithm 1 outputs a sample in LWE s (µ ) s. 
Proof: According to the algorithm 1, we analyzed the plaintext, error, as well as error variance in ciphertext.
Line 1: It is often required that the output ciphertexts have different plaintext spaces after bootstrapping, for example, in the application of constructing basic gates, plaintext space should be {0, 1 4 }. Thus during bootstrapping, we should constructμ (µ 0 + µ 1 )/2,μ (µ 0 − µ 1 )/2 based on specific requirement and satisfyμ +μ µ 0 ,μ −μ µ 1 . Line 2: Expand ciphertext c toc = (ā,b) = ( 2N c ). This operation is to make use of the multi-to-2 mapping between the power and coefficients of X in polynomials and build round function.
Line 3: Construct the multi-to-2 mapping between the power and coefficients of X in polynomials (1 + X N ) . The following formula shows that if the power of X belongs to {0, N /2−1}U{3N /2, 2N −1}, then it is mapped to coefficient µ , and if the power of X belongs to (N /2, 3N /2 − 1)}, it is mapped to −μ .
Line 4: Initial assignment for TLWE ciphertext. In this paper, ACC is the accumulator. The initial TLWE ciphertext generated byb is trivialTLWE a=0 = (0, Xb), which has no error. This step outputs the initial TLWE ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext Xb · testv, with both error and error variance are 0. 
Comparing to the bound of error in CGGI16 2n(k +1)lβN α+ kNtγ +n(1+kN )ε+kN 2 −(t+1) , the error in our bootstrapping grows more slowly.
Error Variance:
Comparing to the bound of error variance in CGGI16 2Nn(k +1)lβ 2 ϑ BK +kNtV KS +n(1+kN )ε 2 +kN 2 −2(t+1) , the error variance in our bootstrapping grows more slowly, thus lead to a higher correctness of our scheme.
B. SECURITY
Based on CGGI16 scheme, we made a modification on accelerating the bootstrapping. The main difference between our work and CGGI16 lies in the enhanced homomorphic constant multiplication (EHCM) presented in this paper. The input of constant multiplication in CGGI16 is a TGSW ciphertext of key TGSW (s i ) and an integer a i . While in our EHCM process, the input is changed into ciphertexts of TGSW s ,α (s 2i−1 s 2i ), TGSW s ,α (s 2i−1 (s 2i − 1)), TGSW s ,α ((s 2i−1 − 1)s 2i ), TGSW s ,α ((s 2i−1 − 1)(s 2i − 1)) and two integers a 2i−1 , a 2i . Basing on the circular security assumption, these ciphertexts leak no information about the plaintext or key, thus our scheme is as safe as CGGI16.
C. PARAMETERS
We optimized the parameters of CGGI16. In detail, the precision ε = 1/(2B l g ), which is used to decompose a TLWE sample, is too high in CGGI16. We recommend the parameters l = 2, B g = 512, β = 256 instead of l = 3, B g = 1024, β = 512. Other parameters, corresponding to our scheme, is n = 500, N = 1024, k = 1, ε = 2 −31 , α = 9.0 · 10 −9 , γ = 3.05 · 10 −5 , t = 15.
1) OUR PARAMETERS IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY
Noticing that a smaller l will lead to a lower dimension ciphertext u ∈ (k+1)l , smaller scale of TGSW ciphertext
, and a quicker multiplication between ciphertext u and TGSW ciphertext than CGGI16. As hundreds of multiplications during the accumulate operations take up most of the time of bootstrapping, thus the change of l will improves the efficiency seriously.
2) OUR PARAMETERS IMPROVE THE CORRECTNESS
Though our parameters will lead to lower precision ε = 1/(2B l g ), the smaller l will lead to lower dimension, which result in smaller errors. Putting all of our recommendatory parameters into the theorem 12, we found that the final error variance after bootstrapping is 2.41 × 10 −5 , corresponding to a standard deviation of σ = 0.0049, which guarantee that the noise amplitude after bootstrapping is smaller than 1/16 (which guarantee the correctness of bootstrapping) with a high probability of erf (2δ/16) ≥ 1 − 2 −54 ,which is higher than the probability 1 − 2 −33.56 in CGGI16 and 1 − 2 −32 in FHEW).
3) OUR PARAMETERS DO NOT COMPROMISE SECURITY
We changed the parameters in CGGI16, which is used to decompose TLWE sample. The decomposition operate on the ciphertexts directly, and doesn't leak any information about the key. So the new parameters will not decrease the security level.
Comparing to CGGI16, a flaw of our scheme is that the homomorphic evaluation key is increased from 52.6M into 60.5M, which is the sum of Bootstrapping Key (31.3M)and Key Switching Key (29.2M). Bootstrapping Key is the size of 2nl(k + 1) TLWE ciphertext, and a TLWE sample is almost (k + 1) · N · 32 bits [21] .
D. IMPLEMENTATION
Based on the code of CGGI16 (TFHE), we implement our scheme with parameters: n = 500, N = 1024, k = 1, l = 2, B g = 512, β = 256, ε = 2 −31 , α = 9.0 · 10 −9 , γ = 3.05 · 10 −5 , t = 15. We implemented CGGI16, CGGI17 and our scheme on a 64-bit computer with i7-4930MX at 3.00GHz, with OS Ubuntu Kylin 14.04, GNU version 6.2 and fftw version 3.3.6. We implemented the scheme based on two different libraries (fftw, spqlios), and tested our scheme's efficiency in debug mode and release mode: Debug/fftw, Debug/spqlios, release/fftw, release/spqlios. What's more, we measured the time of key generation, encryption and, bootstrapping during operating FHE. We didn't analyze the decryption process since it only takes about 2 microseconds (µs). The result shows that bootstrapping in our scheme only takes 52 percent of CGGI16 time in release/spqlios model, which is the most efficient FHE scheme. Details are as follows:
THREE ADDENDS AS A GROUP
In this paper, we give an example of two addends −ā i s i as a group. In the actual experiment, we let three addends −ā i s i as a group to get a quicker bootstrapping in our code. Similar to Theorem 11, we construct Keybundle i as follows, which is a TGSW sample of message X −a 3i−2 ·s 3i−2 −a 3i−1 ·s 3i−1 −a 3i ·s 3i . The flaw of this setting is that the evaluation key will be 70.1M which is still reasonable. 
IV. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
An efficient fully homomorphic encryption scheme with 10ms bootstrapping is presented in this paper. Experiment shows that our scheme has smaller error and error variance, and most important of all, the time of bootstrapping in our scheme is within 10ms, which is only 52 percent of CGGI16, and is less than CGGI17 in ASIACRYPT 2017. A weakness of CGGI16 and our scheme lies in that the process of bootstrapping involves many matrix-vector multiplications which cost a lot of memory. We will focus on optimizing the memory consumption and improving the efficiency of FHE in our future work. 
